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environmentsAbstract In the literature, many three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols are
put forwarded to established a secure session key between two users with the help of trusted server.
The computed session key will ensure secure message exchange between the users over any insecure
communication networks. In this paper, we identified some deficiencies in Tan’s 3PAKE protocol
and then devised an improved 3PAKE protocol without symmetric key en/decryption technique
for mobile-commerce environments. The proposed protocol is based on the elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy and one-way cryptographic hash function. In order to prove security validation of the pro-
posed 3PAKE protocol we have used widely accepted AVISPA software whose results confirm that
the proposed protocol is secure against active and passive attacks including replay and man-in-the-
middle attacks. The proposed protocol is not only secure in the AVISPA software, but it also securegraphy
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for mobile-commerce environments. Journalagainst relevant numerous security attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, impersonation attack,
parallel attack, key-compromise impersonation attack, etc. In addition, our protocol is designed
with lower computation cost than other relevant protocols. Therefore, the proposed protocol is
more efficient and suitable for practical use than other protocols in mobile-commerce environments.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The authentication of the communicating clients and the con-
fidentiality of the transmitted message are the primary objec-
tives of network security, when the communication media is
a public network. Thus, to achieve these two security goals
simultaneously, many 3PAKE protocols have been introduced.
3PAKE protocol allows two clients to authenticate each other
with the assistance of a trusted server and then computes a
secret session key via any public network. The session key
can subsequently be used to establish a secure channel between
the clients. 3PAKE protocol is divided into following cate-
gories: password-based 3PAKE (Lin et al., 2000, 2001, 2004;
Chang and Chang, 2004; Lu and Cao, 2006; Chen et al.,
2008b; Yoon and Yoo, 2008; Sun et al., 2005; Lee and
Hwang, 2010; Yang et al., 2007; Reddy and
Padmavathamma, 2007) and 3PAKE protocol using server’s
public key (Chen et al., 2008a; Yang and Chang, 2009; Pu
et al., 2009; Tan, 2010a). In password-based 3PAKE protocol,
two clients share an easy-memorable password with the trusted
server and then generate the session key securely between them
with the help of the server. However, most of these protocols
are susceptible to undetectable off-line password guessing
attack (Lin et al., 2000, 2001), on-line password guessing
attack (Chen et al., 2008b; Yoon and Yoo, 2008; Sun et al.,
2005; Nam et al., 2006; Phan et al., 2008), impersonation
attack (Chung and Ku, 2008), unknown key-share attack
(Phan et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2008), etc. In addition, the com-
putation cost and communication load of these protocols are
heavy because they have employed the modular exponentia-
tion (Lin et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2004; Chang and Chang,
2004; Chen et al., 2008b; Sun et al., 2005), public/symmetric
key encryption/decryption (Lin et al., 2000, 2001; Chang and
Chang, 2004; Yoon and Yoo, 2008; Sun et al., 2005) and the
transmitted message size is large in each round (Lin et al.,
2000; Lee et al., 2004; Chang and Chang, 2004; Sun et al.,
2005). Due to the limitations of bandwidth, computation abil-
ity and storage space of the low-power mobile devices, the
above mentioned protocols are not suitable for mobile-
commerce environments. Another type of 3PAKE protocol
used the server’s public key and public/symmetric key cryp-
tosystem. In Fig. 1, we have made a tree structure to show
the 3PAKE protocol division categories and their differences.
1.1. Literature review
In 2008, Chen et al. (2008a) proposed a round and
computation-efficient 3PAKE protocol using smartcard, but
the protocol is later shown to be vulnerable to stolen-verifier
attack as claimed by Yang and Chang (2009). If the adversary
steals the pre-shared secret from the smartcard, then he/sheet al., An improved three party authent
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other clients. Moreover, the protocol has the high computation
cost and communication loads. Therefore, Chen et al.’s
3PAKE protocol is not suitable for mobile-commerce environ-
ments. To overcome the weaknesses of Chen et al., Yang and
Chang (2009) proposed an efficient 3PAKE protocol using
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and without sharing any
pre-shared secrete between client and server in which computa-
tion and communication overheads for establishing a session
key are significantly reduced. However, Pu et al. (2009)
demonstrated that the protocol is potentially vulnerable to
unknown key-share attack, man-in-the-middle attack and
impersonation attack.
1.2. Motivation and contribution
In 2010, Tan (2010a) independently pointed out that Yang and
Chang’s protocol is still susceptible to impersonation-of-
initiator attack, impersonation-of-responder attack and paral-
lel attack, and further proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol
based on ECC. In 2011, Nose et al. (2011) demonstrated that
Tan’s 3PAKE protocol still suffers from the impersonation-of-
initiator attack, impersonation-of-responder attack and man-
in-the-middle attack. Nose et al. also claimed that these three
attacks can be mounted on Yang and Chang’s protocol
(Yang and Chang, 2009), and Pu et al.’s protocol (Pu et al.,
2009). Furthermore, this paper shows that Tan’s protocol can-
not resist the known session-specific temporary attack and the
clock synchronization problem. In addition, Tan’s protocol
has high computation cost due to additional elliptic curve sca-
lar point multiplication and symmetric en/decryption process.
In this paper, we proposed an improved 3PAKE protocol
based on ECC for mobile-commerce environments. The pro-
posed protocol employs the simple hash function (Message
Digest Algorithm, 1992) but no en/decryption (Advanced
Encryption Standard, 2001) process is needed. The proposed
protocol is secure under known attacks and has lower compu-
tation cost, and thus it will be suitable for mobile-commerce
environments.
1.3. Outline of the paper
We presented the basic concept of elliptic curve cryptography
and the related computational problems in Section 2. Section 3
addressed Tan’s 3PAKE protocol and the security analysis of it
is given in Section 4. We then proposed our improved protocol
in Section 5. The formal security validation of our protocol in
AVISPA software is explained in Section 6. The informal secu-
rity analysis of our protocol appears in Section 7. Section 8 dis-
cussed the performance analysis and the conclusion of this
paper in Section 9.icated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
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Fig. 1 Different types of 3PAKE protocols.
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2.1. Elliptic curve cryptography
The ECC was initially proposed by Koblitz (1987), and its
security was based on the difficulty of ECDLP. Later on, it
is widely accepted in designing different cryptographic proto-
cols for its effectiveness in security, communication and com-
putation and a number of efficient ECC-based PKCs have
been proposed. For the sake of clarity, the basics of the elliptic
curve cryptography and some related computationally hard
problems are given below.
Let E=Fq be a set of elliptic curve points over a prime field
Fq, defined by the following non-singular elliptic curve
equation:
y2 mod q ¼ ðx3 þ axþ bÞ mod q ð1Þ
where x; y; a; b 2 Fq and ð4a3 þ 27b2Þ mod q–0. The additive
elliptic curve group defined as Gq ¼ fðx; yÞ : x; y 2 Fq and
ðx; yÞ 2 E=Fqg [ fOg, where the point ‘‘O” is known as ‘‘point
at infinity” or ‘‘zero point”. A brief discussion about the elliptic
curve group properties is given below:
 Point addition. Let P ;Q be two points on the curve (1), then
P þ Q ¼ R, where the line joining P and Q intersects the
curve (1) at R, and the reflection of it with respect to x-
axis is R.
 Point subtraction. If Q ¼ P , then P þ Q ¼ P  P ¼ O i.e.,
the line joining of P and P intersects the curve (1) at O.
 Point doubling. Point doubling is the addition of a point P
on the curve (1) to itself to obtain another point Q on the
same curve. Let 2P ¼ Q, the tangent line at P intersects
the curve (1) at Q and the reflection of it with respect to
x-axis is Q.
 Scalar point multiplication. The scalar point multiplication
in Gq is defined as cP ¼ P þ P þ    þ P (c times), where
c 2 Zq is a scalar.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenti
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integer such that dP ¼ O and d > 0.
2.2. Computational problem
Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP)). Given Q;R 2 Eqða; bÞ, where R ¼ a Q and
a 2 Zq. It is hard to compute a from R.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Prob-
lem). Given ðQ; a Q; b QÞ 2 Eqða; bÞ for any a; b 2 Zq, com-
putation of a  b Q is hard.3. Review of Tan’s 3PAKE protocol
In this section, we reviewed and analyzed Tan’s 3PAKE proto-
col (Tan, 2010a) based on ECC (Koblitz, 1987; Menezes et al.,
1996). The protocol is composed of two phases: system initial-
ization phase and authenticated key exchange phase.
3.1. System initialization phase
In this phase, S initializes and select system’s parameters as
follows:
Step 1 Select a finite field F q over q > 2
160.
Step 2 Select an elliptic curve Eqða; bÞ: y2 mod q ¼
ðx3 þ axþ bÞ mod q with order n over F q, where
a; b 2 F q and ð4a3 þ 27b2Þ– 0 mod q.
Step 3 Select a symmetric en/decryption algorithm
EkðÞ=DkðÞ (e.g., AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard, 2001)), where k denotes the symmetric
key.cated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
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Step 5 Publish Eqða; bÞ;EkðÞ=DkðÞ and Q.
Step 6 The clients A and B must register to S to generate
their private/public key pair ðdA=UAÞ and ðdB=UBÞ.
The private/public key pair of S is ðdS=USÞ, where
UA ¼ dA  Q;UB ¼ dB  Q and US ¼ dS  Q.
3.2. Authenticated key exchange phase
This phase is divided into three rounds as described below.
Round 1. In this round, A performs the following operations:
Step 1 Select an integer rA 2 Zq randomly and compute
RA ¼ rA  UA and KA ¼ rA  dA  US ¼ ðKAx;KAyÞ.
Step 2 Randomly select wA 2 Zq and then compute
W A ¼ wA  Q.
Step 3 Select a time stamp T A and compute
CAS ¼ EKAxðRA;W A; IDA; IDB; T AÞ using the encryp-
tion key KAx.
Step 4 Send the messages ðIDA;RequestÞ and ðIDA;CSA;RAÞ
to B and S, respectively. Here, the message
‘‘Request” denotes a request that A asks B to share
a session key with him.
Round 2. In this round, B performs the following operations
after receiving the initiation request ðIDA;RequestÞ
from A:
Step 1 Select an integer rB 2 Zq randomly and compute
RB ¼ rB  UB and KB ¼ rB  dB  US ¼ ðKBx;KByÞ.
Step 2 Randomly select wB 2 Zq and then compute
W B ¼ wB  Q.
Step 3 Select a time stamp T B and compute
CBS ¼ EKBxðRB;W B; IDB; IDA; T BÞ using the encryp-
tion key KBx.
Step 4 Send the messages ðIDB;ResponseÞ and
ðIDB;CBS ;RBÞ to A and S, respectively. Here, the
message ‘‘Response” means that B accepts A’s
request.
Round 3. S executes the following operations after receiving
the messages ðIDA;CSA;RAÞ and ðIDB;CBS ;RBÞ from
A and B:
Step 1 S first validates the time stamp hT A; T Bi and then
computes the symmetric keys KA ¼ dS  RA ¼
ðKAx;KAyÞ and KB ¼ dS  RB ¼ ðKBx;KByÞ.
Step 2 Retrieve ðRA;W A; IDA; IDB; T AÞ ¼ DKAxðCASÞ and
ðRB;W B; IDB; IDA; T BÞ ¼ DKBxðCBSÞ using KAx and
KBx as the decryption key, respectively.
Step 3 S checks if the decrypted timestamps T A and T B are
same as received T A and T B, and then compares
decrypted IDA and IDB are same as received IDA
and IDB, respectively.
Step 4 Furthermore, S checks if the decrypted RA and the
received RA are same. If the result is negative, then
S sends an authentication-failed message to B and
also checks if the decrypted RB and the received RB
are same. If the condition violates then S sends an
authentication-failed message to A. After validatingPlease cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authent
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CSA ¼ EKAxðRA;W B; IDA; T S ; IDSÞ and CSB ¼ EKBx
ðRB;W A; IDB; T S ; IDSÞ.
Step 5 S sends hIDS ;CSA; T Si and hIDS ;CSB; T Si to A and B,
respectively.On receiving hIDS ;CSA; T Si from S, A
performs the following operations to accomplish
the session key exchange.
Step 6 A, validates IDS and T S , and then decrypts CSA using
KAx and retrieves ðRA;W B; IDA; T S ; IDSÞ ¼ DKAxðCSAÞ.
A then checks if IDS and T S are valid and the
decrypted RA is same as his own RA selected in Round
1. If both the condition hold, then A confirms that B
is authenticated by S. Then A computes the session
key SK ¼ wA  W B ¼ wA  wB  Q. Otherwise, A rejects
the transaction.In the same way, B executes the
following operations after receiving hIDS ;CSB; T Si
from S.
Step 7 B validates IDS and T S , and checks that the
decrypted RB is same as his own RB, selected in
Round 2. If they are same, B confirms that A has
been authenticated by S and generates the session
key by calculating SK ¼ wB  W A ¼ wA  wB  Q.
Otherwise, B rejects the transaction.
4. Security vulnerabilities of the Tan’s 3PAKE protocol
Although, Tan’s 3PAKE protocol renovates the weaknesses of
Yang and Chang’s protocol, we found that Tan’s protocol is
not suitable for real environments as it has the following
drawbacks:
4.1. Known session-specific temporary information attack
In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) investigated the known
session-specific temporary information attack. Later on, Cheng
et al. (2005) pointed out that if the adversary (A) gained the
knowledge about the ephemeral secrets (selected by A and B)
of a session, however, he should not be able to determine the
resulting session key. The following conditions encouraged us
to protect this kind of attack and it may happen in real environ-
ments due to the following reasons (Mandt, 2006):
 The clients and the server must trust on the internal/
external source of random number generator that may be
controlled by A (Islam, 2014a,b,c; Islam et al., 2015;
Islam and Khan, 2014).
 The random numbers are generally stored in an insecure
device. If the random numbers (ephemeral secrets) are not
erased properly in each session, then A may hijack users’
computer and learns the random numbers (Islam, 2014a,
b,c; Islam et al., 2015; Islam and Khan, 2014).
From the aforementioned discussions, we claimed that
Yang and Chang’s 3PAKE protocol (Yang and Chang,
2009), Pu et al.’s 3PAKE protocol (Pu et al., 2009), Tan’s
3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010a), Tan’s 3PAKE protocol (Tan,
2010b) and He et al.’s 3PAKE protocol (He et al., 2013) failedicated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
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Table 1 Different notations used in this paper.
Notations Meaning
A The protocol participant (initiator)
B The protocol participant (responder)
S The protocol participant (server)
k The security parameter
q A large prime number of k-bit length and q > 3
Fq A field of prime order q
Eqða; bÞ A set of elliptic curve points of order n, where a; b 2 Fq
Q A base point of order n over Eqða; bÞ
ExðÞ=DxðÞ The symmetric en/decryption algorithm under the key
x (e.g., AES Advanced Encryption Standard, 2001)
ðdA;UAÞ The private/public key pair of the entity i, where
i ¼ A;B;S, where di 2 Zq and Ui ¼ di Q
HðÞ One-way cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD5)
k The message concatenation operator
ðÞ The elliptic cure scalar point multiplication
A The Adversary
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attack. Since, in Yang and Chang (2009), Pu et al. (2009),
Tan (2010a,b), and He et al. (2013), clients A and B select
the ephemeral secrets wA and wB, respectively and after the suc-
cessful authentication, they compute the session key as
SK ¼ wA  wB Q. If the ephemeral secrets, i.e., wA and wB
are disclosed to A, then the session key SK can be easily com-
promised by A. Therefore, Yang and Chang’s 3PAKE proto-
col (Yang and Chang, 2009), Pu et al.’s 3PAKE protocol (Pu
et al., 2009), Tan’s 3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010a), Tan’s
3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010b) and He et al.’s 3PAKE protocol
(He et al., 2013) cannot resist the known session-specific tem-
porary information attack. The detailed explanation of known
session-specific temporary information attack is given in Islam
and Biswas (2012).
4.2. Clock synchronization problem
In timestamp-based protocols (Tan, 2010a,b; He et al., 2013),
system clocks of all the connected devices must be synchro-
nized, otherwise, the clock synchronization problem will ham-
per the protocol execution. Tan’s 3PAKE protocol (Tan,
2010a) employs the timestamp to detect forced delay to protect
the replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. However, the
timestamp raises the problem of clock synchronization in large
networks, such as wide area networks, mobile communication
networks and satellite communication networks. All the proto-
cols based on the concept of timestamp can withstand the
replay attack using systems’ timestamp provided the system
clock must be synchronized; otherwise the protocol will not
work properly. Since the transmission delay is long and unpre-
dictable in a wide area network environment (Gong, 1992), a
potential replay attack exists in all timestamp-based protocols.
In the communication networks with tightly synchronized sys-
tem clocks, such as local area networks, the timestamp-based
protocol is preferable. On the other hand, the nonce-based
protocol is suitable for a large network where clock synchro-
nization is difficult, such as wide area networks, mobile com-
munication networks, and satellite communication networks.
Thus, Tan’s 3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010a) is not suitable for
mobile-commerce environments. Accordingly, we confirmed
that Tan’s 3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010b) and He et al.’s
3PAKE protocol (He et al., 2013) also suffered from the same
problem as they employed the timestamp. Note that, in our
3PAKE protocol we used the random number-based (nonce)
solution, instead of timestamp that eliminated the synchro-
nization problem.
4.3. High computation cost
In Table 3, we observed that the computation cost of the pro-
tocol proposed in Tan (2010a), Nam et al. (2006), Phan et al.
(2008), Tan (2010b), and He et al. (2013) is still high. A 3PAKE
protocol needs higher amount of communication processing
time, which means two communicating clients have to spend
more time to establish a common session key between them,
so the protocol may not be suitable for mobile-commerce envi-
ronments. Since, the mobile devices have low computation
ability, limited power supply and low storage space. Thus,
the protocol proposed in Tan (2010a), Nam et al. (2006),
Phan et al. (2008), Tan (2010b), and He et al. (2013) cannotPlease cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenti
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reduce the computation cost, in our proposed protocol we
avoided the use of encryption/decryption technique and used
the light weight hash function.
5. The proposed 3PAKE protocol
To renovate the drawbacks of Tan (2010a), Nam et al. (2006),
Phan et al. (2008), Tan (2010b), and He et al. (2013), we pro-
posed a more efficient and secure 3PAKE protocol using ECC
for mobile-commerce environments. The proposed 3PAKE
protocol employs one-way hash function instead of a costly
symmetric cryptosystem. The notations used in the proposed
3PAKE protocol is given in Table 1. Our protocol has two
phases: system initialization phase and authenticated key
exchange phase.
5.1. System initialization phase
In this phase, S initializes system parameters as done in Tan’s
3PAKE protocol (Tan, 2010a). In our protocol, we used a one-
way secure hash functionHðÞ (i.e.,MD5) instead of symmetric
en/decryption tool.
5.2. Authenticated key exchange phase
In this phase, three entities are involved: two clients A and B
that wish to establish a secure session key between them, and
a trusted server S, who assists A and B to authenticate each
other via a public network. The detailed steps of our protocol
are given as follows.
Round 1. In this round, A, executes the following steps:
Step 1 Pick an integer rA 2 Zq randomly and then compute
HA ¼ HðrAkdAÞ and RA ¼ HA  Q.
Step 2 Then compute KA ¼ dA  US ¼ dA  dS  Q and
CAS ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkKAÞ.
Step 3 Send ðIDA;RequestÞ and ðIDA; IDB;RA;CASÞ to B and
S, respectively.cated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
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following operations are executed by B.
Step 1 Pick an integer rB 2 Zq randomly and then compute
HB ¼ HðrBkdBÞ and RB ¼ HB  Q.
Step 2 Compute KB ¼ dB  US ¼ dB  dS  Q and CBS ¼
HðIDBkIDAkRBkKBÞ.
Step 3 Send ðIDB;ResponseÞ and ðIDB; IDA, RB;CBSÞ to A
and S, respectively.
Round 3. After receiving ðIDA; IDB;RA, CSAÞ and ðIDB;
IDA;RB;CBSÞ from A and B; S performs the following
operations.
Step 1 Compute the symmetric keys KA ¼ dS 
UA ¼ dA  dS  Q and KB ¼ dS  UB ¼ dB  dS  Q,
respectively.
Step 2 Compute CAS ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkKAÞ using received
RA and the computed KA. S checks the condition
CAS ¼ ?CAS . If it does not hold, S sends an
authentication-failed message to B. Otherwise, S
computes CSA ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKAÞ and sends
the message ðRB;CSAÞ to A.
Step 3 Compute CBS ¼ HðIDBkIDAkRBkKBÞ using received
RB and his own KB. S checks the condition
CBS ¼ ?CBS . If it does not hold, S sends an
authentication-failed message to A. Otherwise, S
computes CSB ¼ HðIDBkIDAkRBkRAkKBÞ and sends
the message ðRA;CSBÞ to B. Now, A executes follow-
ing operations after receiving the message ðRB;CSAÞ
from S.
Step 4 On receiving ðRB;CSAÞ;A computes CSA ¼
HðIDAkIDBkRAkKAÞ using his own RA and KA
generated in Round 1 and the received RB. Now, A
checks the condition CSA ¼ ?CSA. If the result is
positive, A computes the session key SK ¼
HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ, where K ¼ HA  RB ¼
HA  HB  Q. Otherwise, A terminates the session.
Now, B takes the following actions after receiving
the message ðRA;CSBÞ from S.
Step 5 Upon receiving ðRA;CSBÞ;B computes CSb ¼
HðIDBkIDAkRBkRAkKBÞ using the values RB and KB
generated in Round 2 and the received RA. Now, B
checks the condition CSB ¼ ?CSB. If the result is pos-
itive then computes the session key SK ¼
HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ, where K ¼ HB  RA ¼
HA  HB  Q. Otherwise, B terminates the session.
We explained the proposed 3PAKE protocol in the
Fig. 2.
6. Simulation for formal security verification using AVISPA tool
This section is provided for formal security verification of the
proposed 3PAKE protocol using AVISPA simulator (Amin
and Biswas, 2015; Islam and Biswas, 2014, 2013) to ensure that
the protocol is secure against the active and passive attacks
including replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. We provided
the concept and knowledge about AVISPA simulator tool and
then present HLPSL code description along with simulation
results of the our protocol.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authent
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AVISPA is considered as a widely-accepted simulation tool for
the formal security verification, which measured whether the
security protocol is SAFE or UNSAFE. AVISPA supports
High Level Protocol Specification Language HLPSL. The
structure of AVISPA tool is shown in Fig. 3. Currently,
AVISPA (2015) supports four different back-ends and abstrac-
tion based methods, which are integrated through the HLPSL
code. The First back-end, called On-the-fly Model-Checker
(OFMC) is responsible for symbolic techniques for exploring
the state space in a demand-driven way. The second back-end
(CL-AtSe) provides a translation from any security protocol
specification written as transition relation in intermediate for-
mat (IF) into a set of constraints, which are effectively used to
find whether there are attacks on protocols. The third back-
end is SAT based Model checker which generates a proposi-
tional formulae and then fed to a state-of-the-art SAT solver
and any model found is translated back into an attack. The
Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the
Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP) is the last back-end,
which is responsible for approximating the intruder knowledge
by using regular tree languages. As mentioned earlier, HLPSL
specification is translated into the intermediate form (IF)
using hlpsl2if translator. The (IF), which is a lower level lan-
guage than HLPSL is read directly by the back-ends to
AVISPA tool. It may be noted that this intermediate transla-
tion step is transparent to the user.
It is to be noted that AVISPA is a role-oriented language
that means each participant plays a role during the protocol
execution. Each role is independent of the others, getting some
initial information by parameters and communicating with the
other roles by channels. It is also to be noted that the channel
may be secure or insecure. The intruder is modeled using
Dolev-Yao model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) with the possibility
for the intruder to assume a legitimate role in a protocol run.
The role system also described the number of sessions, the num-
ber of principals and the roles. Based on the four back-ends,
OUTPUT FORMAT (OF) is generated and after successful
execution, (OF) described the result whether the protocol is
safe or unsafe or under what condition the output is obtained.
6.2. Brief specification of the proposed protocol
In this section, we discussed all the roles involved in our pro-
posed 3PAKE protocol in HPLSL language. In Fig. 4, we
implemented the role for the client A in HLPSL language. Ini-
tially, S provides the private/prublic key pair to A and then
sends SndðIDA:IDB:RA0:CAS0Þ to A through open channel.
It is to be noted that the random number RA0 was generated
using new() operation and A transmits any message with the
help of Snd() operation. The declaration secretðfDA0g;
subs1; fA;SgÞ indicates that the private key DA0 is only known
to (A,S). In transition 2, A receives RcvðRB:CSA0Þ from S
through open channel with the help of Rcv() operation and
then computes the session key.
In Fig. 5, we implemented the role for B in HLPSL lan-
guage. Resembling, A;S provide security parameters and
finally sends SndðIDB:IDA:RB0:CBS0Þ to S through an open
channel. It is to be noted that the random number RB0 was
generated using new() operation and B transmits any messageicated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
Fig. 2 The proposed 3PAKE protocol.
An improved three party authenticated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography 7with the help of Snd() operation. The declaration
secretðfDB0g; subs2; fB;SgÞ indicates that the private key DB0
is only known to (B,S). In transition 2, B receives
RcvðRA:CSB0Þ from S through an open channel with the help
of Rcv() operation and then computes the session key.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenti
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer aIn Fig. 6, we implemented the role for S in HLPSL lan-
guage. S first received the messages RcvðIDA:IDB:RA0:KA0Þ
and RcvðIDA:IDB:RB0:KB0Þ in parallel from A and B, respec-
tively. Then, S sends SndðRA:CSB0Þ and SndðRA:CSB0Þ to A
and B, respectively. The declaration secretðfDSg; subs3; fSgÞcated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
role alice (A, S, B : agent, 
% H is hash function 
H, Mul: hash_func, Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) 
played_by A 
def= 
local State : nat, 
DA, UA, IDA, IDB, RAA, Q, US: text, 
HA, RA, RB, KA, CAS, CSA, SKA, K: message, 
Inc : hash_func 
const alice_server, server_bob, alice_bob, alice_server, 
subs1, subs2, subs3: protocol_id 
init State :=0 
transition 
1. State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1  /\ DA'  :=new() 
/\ UA' := Mul(DA'.Q)  
/\ RAA' := new() 
/\ HA' := H(RAA'.DA') 
/\ RA' := Mul(HA'.Q)
/\ KA' := Mul(DA.US) 
/\ CAS' := H(IDA.IDB.RA'.KA') 
/\ Snd(IDA.IDB.RA'.CAS') 
/\ secret({DA'}, subs1, {A,S}) 
2. State = 1 /\ Rcv(RB.CSA') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ K' := Mul(HA.RB) 
/\ SKA' := H(IDA.IDB.RA.RB.K') 
end role 
Fig. 4 Role specification for the user A (initiator) in HLPSL.
HLPSL (High−Level Protocol Specification Language)
 
Translator
HLPSL2IF
IF
(Intermediate Format) 
 
OFMC
(On-the-fly Model-
Checker) 
CL-AtSe
(Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher) 
SATMC
(SAT-based Model-
Checker) 
TA4SP
(Tree Automata−based
Protocol Analyzer) 
OF
(Output Format) 
Fig. 3 Architecture of the AVISPA Tool.
8 S. H. Islam et al.indicates that the private key DS is kept secret permanently
and only known to S.
In Fig. 7, we presented the roles for the session, goal and
the environment in HLPSL language. In session, all the basic
roles including the roles for A,S and B are instanced with con-
crete arguments. The environment section contains the global
constant and composition of one or more sessions and the
intruder knowledge is also given. The current version
(2006/02/2013) of HLPSL supports the standard authentica-
tion and secrecy goals. In our implementation, the following
three secrecy goals and two authentications are verified.
(1) The secrecy_of subs1 represents that the private key of A
is kept secret to only ðS;AÞ.
(2) The secrecy_of subs2 represents that the private key of B
is kept secret to only ðS;BÞ.
(3) The secrecy_of subs3 represents that the private key of
server is kept secret to only ðSÞ.
(4) The authentication_on alice_server_raa represents that
A generates a random number raa, where raa is only
known to A and if S receives it through message
securely, S then authenticates A.
(5) The authentication_on bob_server_rbb represents that B
generates a random number rbb, where rbb is only
known to B and if S receives it through message
securely, S then authenticates B.
6.3. Simulation results
In this section, we presented the simulation results of our
3PAKE protocol on the back-ends OFMC and CL-AtSe
using AVISPA web tool. Figs. 8 and 9 ensure that the
proposed protocol is SAFE under two back-ends OFMC
and CL-AtSe, respectively i.e., the proposed protocol is
secure against the active and passive attacks including replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks. Therefore, we claimed thatPlease cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authent
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer athe proposed 3PAKE protocol is secure against security
attacks.
7. Further security analysis
In this section, we further demonstrated that the proposed pro-
tocol eliminates the security weaknesses of Tan’s protocol and
also provides resilience against other known attacks.icated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
role bob (B, S, A : agent, 
% H is hash function 
H, Mul: hash_func, Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) 
played_by B 
def= 
local State : nat, 
DB, UB, IDA, IDB, RBB, Q, US: text, 
HB, RB, RA, KB, CBS, CSB, SKA, K: message, 
Inc : hash_func 
const alice_server, server_bob, alice_bob, alice_server, 
subs1, subs2, subs3: protocol_id 
init State :=0 
transition 
1. State = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|> 
State' := 1  /\ DB' :=new() 
/\ UB' :=Mul(DB'.Q)  
/\ RBB' := new() 
/\ HB' := H(RBB'.DB') 
/\ RB' := Mul(HB'.Q) 
/\ KB' := Mul(DB.US) 
/\ CBS' := H(IDB.IDA.RB'.KB')    %line 50 
/\ Snd(IDB.IDA.RB'.CBS') 
/\ secret({DB'}, subs2, {B,S}) 
2. State = 1 /\ Rcv(RA.CSB') =|> 
State' := 2 /\ K' := Mul(HB.RA) 
/\ SKA' := H(IDA.IDB.RA.RB.K') 
end role 
Fig. 5 Role specification for the user B (responder) in HLPSL.
role server (S, A, B: agent, 
% H is hash function 
H, Mul: hash_func, 
Snd, Rcv: channel(dy) ) 
played_by S 
def= 
local State : nat, 
DS, UB, UA, IDA, IDB, Q, US: text, 
HB, RB, RA, KB, SKB, KA, KAA, KBB, CSA, CSB: message, 
Inc : hash_func 
const alice_server, server_bob, alice_bob, alice_server,  
subs1, subs2, subs3: protocol_id 
init State :=0 
transition 
1. State = 0 /\ Rcv(IDA.IDB.RA'.KA') /\ Rcv(IDA. IDB. RB'.KB') =|> 
State' := 1 /\ US' := Mul(DS.Q) 
/\ KAA' := Mul(DS.UA) 
/\ KBB'  :=Mul(DS.UB) 
/\ CSA' := H(IDA.IDB.RA.RB.KAA') 
/\ CSB' := H(IDB.IDA.RB.RA.KBB') 
/\ Snd(RB.CSA') 
/\ Snd(RA.CSB') 
/\ secret({DS}, subs3, {S}) 
end role 
Fig. 6 Role specification for the server S in HLPSL.
role session(A, S, B: agent, 
H, Mul: hash_func) 
def= 
local SI, SJ, RI, RJ, TI, TJ: channel (dy) 
composition 
alice(A, S, B, H, Mul, SI, RI) 
/\ server(A, S, B, H, Mul, SJ, RJ) 
/\ bob(A, S, B, H, Mul, TI, TJ) 
end role 
role environment() 
def= 
const a, s, b: agent, 
h,mul: hash_func, 
ida, idb, ua, ub, da, db, ra, rb, ds, us, cas, cbs, csa, csb,  
kaa, kbb, ha, hb, ka, kb, raa, rbb: text,  
alice_server, server_bob, alice_bob, alice_server,  
subs1, subs2, subs3: protocol_id 
intruder_knowledge = {a, s, b, h, mul, cas, cbs, csa, csb, ra, rb} 
composition 
session( a, s, b, h, mul) 
/\ session(s, a, b, h, mul) 
/\ session(b, s, a, h, mul) 
end role 
goal 
secrecy_of subs1 
secrecy_of subs2 
secrecy_of subs3 
authentication_on alice_server_raa 
authentication_on bob_server_rbb 
end goal 
environment() 
Fig. 7 Role specification for the session, goal and environment
in HLPSL.
An improved three party authenticated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography 9Theorem 1. Under the assumption that the adversary can
eavesdrop all the communicating messages over the public
channel, the proposed protocol provides strong security protec-
tion on the private key of the user and server.
Proof. We supposed that the adversary (A) traps all the trans-
mitting messages between the entities involved of the protocol
during execution and tries to extract confidential parameter of
the user and server such as private key. In order to get success,
the A will face the following problems as follows.
(1) During execution of the authenticated key exchange
phase, A traps hIDA; IDB, RA;CASi from the public
channel, where RA ¼ HA  Q;HA ¼ HðrAkdAÞ;CAS ¼
HðIDAkIDBkRAkKAÞ and rA is the random number. It is
noticeable that A cannot extract HA from RA ¼ HA  Q
due to ECDLP. Additionally, A cannot extract the pri-
vate key dA of A due to non-invertibility property of the
cryptographic one-way hash function. The parameter KA
is reliant on the private key of A and S and protected by
the ECDLP.
(2) Resembling (1), A can eavesdrop hIDB; IDA;RB;CBSi, and
try to compute private key of B and S. However, the A
will face same problem like (1).
(3) During round 3 of the proposed protocol, the A traps
hRB;CSAi and hRB;CSBi from the public channel and tries
to compute the confidential information of A and S,
where CSA ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKAÞ and CSB ¼
HðIDBkIDAkRBkRAkKBÞ. It is worth to note that A can-
not extract any confidential information from
hCSA;CSBi due to one-way hash function.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenticated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
% OFMC 
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BACKEND 
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COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
parseTime: 0.00s 
searchTime: 0.66s 
visitedNodes: 16 nodes 
depth: 6 plies 
Fig. 8 Simulation results for the OFMC back-end.
10 S. H. Islam et al.The above description ensures that the proposed 3PAKE
protocol is secure against A for deriving the private keys of A,
B and S. h
Theorem 2. The proposed protocol is secured against the
impersonation-of-initiator attack.
Proof. Suppose that A wishes to impersonate A (initiator) to
B. The secret key dA of A is unknown to A, so he can try to
extract it from UA ¼ dA Q, but, A cannot derive dA from
UA due to the difficulties of ECDLP. Now, A selects two ran-
dom integers ðrA; d00AÞ 2 Zq, then computes R00A ¼ HðrAkd00AÞ and
K00A ¼ d00A US, and further sends the message ðIDA;RequestÞ
and ðIDA; IDB, R00A;C00SAÞ to B and S, respectively, where
C00AS ¼ HðIDAkIDBkR00AkK00AÞ. Upon receiving ðIDA; IDB;R00A,
C00SAÞ, S computes KA ¼ dS UA ¼ dA  dS Q and
CAS ¼ HðIDAkIDBkR00AkKAÞ and then verifies with receivedSUMMARY 
SAFE
DETAILS 
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
TYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
/home/avispa/web-interface-computation/ 
./tempdir/workfileAcJN8I.if 
GOAL 
As Specified 
BACKEND 
CL-AtSe 
STATISTICS 
Analysed   : 0 states 
Reachable  : 0 states 
Translation: 0.06 seconds 
Computation: 0.00 seconds 
Fig. 9 Simulation results for the CL-AtSe back-end.
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authentication-failed message to B, because CAS–C
00
SA. Thus
the impersonation-of-initiator attack is infeasible to the pro-
posed protocol. h
Theorem 3. The proposed protocol is secured against the
impersonation-of-responder attack.
Proof. Assume that A tries to impersonate B (responder) to A.
First, A selects two random integers rB; d00B 2 Zq and then com-
putes R00B ¼ HðrBkd00BÞ and K00B ¼ d00B US. Then A sends the mes-
sages ðIDB;ResponseÞ and ðIDB; IDA;R00B, C00BSÞ to B and S,
respectively, where C00BS ¼ HðIDBkIDAkR00BkK00BÞ. Upon receiv-
ing A’s message, S computes KB ¼ dS UB and
CBS ¼ HðIDBkIDAkR00BkKBÞ. Next, S compares the computed
CBS with received C
00
BS and confirms that someone is imperson-
ating B, because CBS is not equal to C
00
BS. Therefore, S sends an
authentication-failed message to A. Thus, the proposed proto-
col has the ability to protect the impersonation-of-responder
attack. h
Theorem 4. The proposed protocol is secured against the paral-
lel attack.
Proof. To perform the parallel attack, A captures the previous
protocol run message ðIDA; IDB;RA;CASÞ, which was sent by A
to S. In the current session, A sends the message
ðIDA;NewRequestÞ and ðIDA; IDB, R00A;C00ASÞ to B and S, where
r00A 2 Zq, R00A ¼ Hðr00AkdAÞ Q and C00AS ¼ HðIDAkIDBkR00AkKAÞ.
Now A captures the current session message ðIDA; IDB,
R00A;C
00
ASÞ, and replies with the older session message
ðIDA; IDB;RA;CASÞ to S. Upon receiving A’s request, B sends
the message ðIDB; IDA;R00B, C00BSÞ to S, where
r00B 2 Zq;RB ¼ Hðr00BkdBÞ Q and C00BS ¼ HðIDBkIDAkR00BkKBÞ.
Then S replies with the message ðR00B;C00SAÞ and ðRA, C00SBÞ to
A and B, where C00SA ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkR00BkKAÞ and
C00SB ¼ HðIDBkIDAkR00BkRAkKBÞ. Now B computes the session
key SK ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkR00BkK00Þ, where K00 ¼ HðrAkdAÞ
Hðr00BkdBÞ Q. At the same time, A computes CSA ¼
HðIDAkIDBkR00AkR00BkKAÞ and compares it with received C00SA.
Thus, A rejects the protocol transaction immediately because
CSA–C
00
SA. In the same way, if A replies to B’s message when
A tries to establish a new communication with B, our proposed
protocol has the ability to detect this attack. h
Theorem 5. The proposed protocol is secured against the man-
in-the-middle attack.
Proof. Assume that an A wants to learn the session key SK by
performing the man-in-the-middle attack (Menezes et al.,
1996) to the proposed protocol. However, A cannot compute
KA ¼ dA  dS Q and KB ¼ dB  dS Q without A’s/B’s private
key or S’s private key. Hence, A selects a random number r00C
from Zq and computes RC ¼ HðrCkdCÞ and KC ¼ dC
US ¼ dC  dS Q, where A’s private key is dC. Further, A inter-
cepts the message ðIDA, IDB;RA;CASÞ and ðIDB; IDA;RB;CBSÞ
transmitted form A and B to S and modified to
ðIDA; IDC;RA;CASÞ and ðIDB; IDC;RB, CBSÞ, and then
sends them to S. Furthermore, A sends two concurrenticated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
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to S, where CCS1 ¼ HðIDCkIDAkRCkKCÞ and CCS2 ¼
HðIDCkIDBkRCkKCÞ. S assumes that A tries to establish the
session key to A and B simultaneously. Now S performs the
validity check on the received messages ðIDA; IDC;RA, CASÞ
and ðIDC; IDA;RC;CCS1Þ and ðIDB, IDC;RB;CBSÞ and
ðIDC; IDB;RC;CCS2Þ. For this purpose, S computes
CAS ¼ HðIDAkIDCkRAkKAÞ; CBS ¼ HðIDBkIDCkRBkKBÞ and
checks CAS ¼ ?CAS and CBS ¼ ?CBS. S then sends the
authentication-failed message to A and B, because CAS – CAS
and CBS – CBS. Thus, the man-in-the-middle attack is impos-
sible in the proposed protocol. h
Theorem 6. The proposed protocol is secured against the known
session-specific temporary information attack.
Proof. In the proposed protocol, a session key
SK ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ is securely established in each
session between A and B, where K ¼ HA HB Q is the partial
session key. Assume that A learns two ephemeral secrets rA
and rB by some means. However, A cannot generate
HA ¼ HðrAkdAÞ and HB ¼ HðrBkdBÞ without A’s private key
dA and B’s private key dB, so the partial session key K cannot
be computed and thus, the resulting session key SK is still
unknown to A. In addition, A tries to derive
K ¼ HA HB Q directly from the pair
ðRA;RBÞ ¼ ðHA Q;HB QÞ. Furthermore, the computation
of K is also infeasible due to difficulties of CDH problem.
Thus, the proposed protocol is robust against the known
session-specific temporary information attack. h
Theorem 7. The proposed protocol is secured against the key
offset attack.
Proof. The key offset attack is one of the forms of man-in-the-
middle attack. Suppose that the active Amonitors the commu-
nication channel, e.g., he can modify, delete or delay the mes-
sage in a session, and enforce the clients to agree upon a wrong
session key which is not the one two entities agree on.
Although this attack does not allow A to gain any knowledge
about the agreed session key but two entities generates the
wrong session key. This violates the key integrity property,
which indicates that any accepted session key should depend
only on inputs from the clients. A cannot generate
KA ¼ dA  dS Q and KB ¼ dB  dS Q, so the modification of
CAS=CBS and CSA=CSB is not possible. However, if A modifies
RA and RB;S can detect it by checking CAS ¼ ?CAS and
CBS ¼ ?CBS. Therefore, the proposed protocol can prevent
the key offset attack. h
Theorem 8. The proposed protocol is secured against the
key-compromise impersonation attack.
Proof. The key-compromise impersonation attack indicates
that if the private key of A is known to A then he can
impersonate B to A. However, our 3PAKE protocol does
not allow A to impersonate B to A. Assume that the private
key dA of A is compromised to A who wishes to imperson-
ate B, then A must have a valid key KB ¼ dB US. Other-
wise, he cannot authenticate himself to S. It is possible ifPlease cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenti
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer ahe knows B’s/S’s private key, but A failed to derive dB=dS
form UB=US due to infeasibility of ECDLP. Therefore, the
proposed protocol protects the key-compromise imperson-
ation attack. h
Theorem 9. The proposed protocol is secured against the
unknown key-share attack.
Proof. The unknown key-share attack means, after the com-
pletion of the protocol session, A believed he shared a session
key with B, but B unfortunately believed that he shared a ses-
sion key with A. In our protocol the identities are included in
CAS;CBS;CSA and CSB, and these are validated by A;B and S.
Therefore, A and B get confirmation that they share the session
key with the original clients not with A. h
Theorem 10. The proposed protocol provides session key perfect
forward security.
Proof. The perfect forward security states that if the private
key of one or more clients happens to be disclosed, the security
of previously established session keys should not be compro-
mised. Assume that the private keys dA and dB of A and B
are revealed to A, but he cannot find out the previous and/
or future session keys from this disclosure. A can generate
the session key SK ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ if the partial ses-
sion key K ¼ HA HB Q is known to him/her, and only it can
be computed from ðRA;RBÞ ¼ ðHA Q;HB QÞ provided that
A possesses a polynomial time algorithm that can solve the
CDH problem. Furthermore, the session key SK can be com-
promised if rA and rB are known to A. To do so, A tries to
derive them from RA ¼ HðrAkdAÞ and RB ¼ HðrBkdBÞ but, it
is also impossible due to difficulties of ECDLP and the
‘‘one-way” property of the hash function. Thus, the proposed
protocol provides the perfect forward security. h
Theorem 11. The proposed protocol provides the known-key
security.
Proof. A unique and common session key is generated in each
session and disclosure of one session key should not compro-
mise other session keys. Assume that the current session key
SK ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ is leaked to A, however, he can-
not compute all the previously established session keys from
this disclosure. Since A cannot extract rA=rB and dA=dB from
RA ¼ HðrAkdAÞ Q and RB ¼ HðrBkdBÞ Q as this would be
equivalent to solving the ECDLP and the ‘‘one-way” property
of the hash function. In addition, a hash function is used to
generate the session key therefore, K ¼ HA HB Q cannot be
extracted from the disclosed session key
SK ¼ HðIDAkIDBkRAkRBkKÞ. Thus, the proposed protocol
does not allow the disclosure of past session keys from the
compromised session key. h
Theorem 12. The proposed protocol no key control property of
the session key.
Proof. The session key is generated in each session mutually
by both the clients, and therefore, a single party cannot control
the outcome of the session key to a pre-selected value or lie
within a small set of values. hcated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
Table 2 Computation cost and functionality comparison of proposed protocol with existing related protocols.
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
Yang and Chang (2009)     p p   p p p p
Pu et al. (2009)   p   p  p p p p p
Tan (2010a)   p  p p  p p p p 
Tan (2010b)
p p p p p p  p p p p 
He et al. (2013)
p p p p p p  p p p p 
Proposed
p p p p p p p p p p p p
p
: resist the attack or meet the security criteria; : attack is possible or violate the security criteria; A1: impersonation-of-initiator attack; A2:
impersonation-of-responder attack; A3: parallel session attack; A4: man-in-the-middle attack; A5: key offset attack; A6: key-compromise
Impersonation attack; A7: known session-specific temporary information; A8: unknown key share attack; A9: provide key control; A10: provide
known key security; A11: provide perfect forward secrecy; A12: free from clock synchronization problem.
Table 3 Execution time (ms) of different cryptographic
operation.
Notation Description and execution time (ms)
TPM Time complexity for executing the elliptic curve point
multiplication TPM ¼ 17:10 ms
TSE Time complexity for executing the symmetric en/
decryption TSE ¼ 5:60 ms
TH Time complexity for executing the hash function,
TH ¼ 0:32 ms
Fig. 10 Execution time (ms) of different 3PAKE protocols
including ours.
12 S. H. Islam et al.Table 2 shows the security comparisons of the proposed
protocol and some other relevant protocols. It is obvious that
the proposed protocol supports all the related security
properties.
8. Performance analysis
In this section, we compared the computation cost efficiency of
the proposed protocol with Yang and Chang’s protocol (Yang
and Chang, 2009), Pu et al.’s protocol (Pu et al., 2009), Tan’s
protocol (Tan, 2010a), Tan’s protocol (Tan, 2010b) and He
et al.’s protocol (He et al., 2013). We considered the computa-
tional complexity of different cryptographic operations as exe-
cuted in He et al. (2014) and Schneier (1996). In Table 3, we
listed different computational notations and their execution
time in milliseconds.
It is proven in Schneier (1996) that one symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption operation is at least 100 times faster than
one asymmetric encryption/decryption operation, and one
hashing operation is at least 10 times faster than a symmetric
encryption/decryption in software implementation. The exper-
imental results given in Table 3 are executed on a four-coreTable 4 Computation cost (ms) comparison of proposed protocol
Protocol User A User B
Yang and Chang (2009) 5TPM þ 2TSE  96:70 ms 5TPM þ 2TS
Pu et al. (2009) 5TPM þ 2TSE  96:70 ms 5TPM þ 2TS
Tan (2010a) 5TPM þ 2TSE  96:70 ms 5TPM þ 2TS
Tan (2010b) 5TPM þ 2TSE  96:70 ms 5TPM þ 2TS
He et al. (2013) 3TPM þ 3TH  52:26 ms 3TPM þ 3TH
Proposed 3TPM þ 2TH  54:58 ms 3TPM þ 4TH
Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authent
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer a3.2 GHz machine with 8 GB memory, and the results were
averaged over 300 randomized simulation runs. The experi-
mental evaluations were implemented on the simulator written
inMATLAB. The Table 4 provides a comparative study of the
proposed protocol with other protocols. The computation cost
of the proposed protocol is lesser than the protocols in Yang
and Chang (2009), Pu et al. (2009), Tan (2010a), Tan
(2010b), and He et al. (2013). For better understanding, we
have given the computation cost comparison in Fig. 10.
9. Conclusions
In order to provide the security enhancement, Pu et al.
designed an improved 3PAKE protocol over Yang andwith existing related protocols.
Server S Total cost
E  96:70 ms 2TPM þ 4TSE  56:40 ms 249.80 ms
E  96:70 ms 2TPM þ 4TSE  56:40 ms 249.80 ms
E  96:70 ms 2TPM þ 4TSE  56:40 ms 249.80 ms
E  96:70 ms 2TPM þ 4TSE  56:40 ms 249.80 ms
 52:26 ms 3TPM þ 3TH  69:68 ms 174.20 ms
 54:58 ms 2TPM þ 4TH  37:48 ms 146.64 ms
icated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
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another improvement over Pu et al.’s 3PAKE protocol to resist
the impersonation-of-initiator attack, impersonation-of-
responder attack and parallel attack. We again examined
Tan’s 3PAKE protocol and pointed out that still the protocol
is not secure against the known session-specific temporary
attack and cannot withstand the clock synchronization prob-
lem. In addition, Tan et al.’s 3PAKE protocol has high compu-
tation cost due to the involvement of the additional elliptic
curve scalar point multiplications and symmetric cryptosys-
tem. We then designed a computation efficient 3PAKE proto-
col for mobile commerce environment to resolve the security
pitfalls of the Tan’s 3PAKE protocol. The security analysis
on our 3PAKE protocol confirmed that the proposed protocol
not only renovates Tan’s 3PAKE protocol, but it also secure
against other known attacks. Additionally, the simulation
results on AVISPA software confirmed that the proposed
3PAKE protocol is secure under OFMC and CL-AtSe back-
ends. The performance analysis ensured that the proposed
3PAKE protocol is computationally efficient than other exist-
ing works.
Acknowledgements
SK Hafizul Islam is supported by the Outstanding Potential
for Excellence in Research and Academics (OPERA) award,
Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS) Pilani, Pilani
Campus, Rajasthan, India. The authors extend their sincere
appreciations to the National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grant No. 61300220, the Research Fund of the
State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment,
BUAA under Grant no. SKLSDE-2014KF-02, and the China
Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project under Grant
No. 2014M550590.
References
Advanced Encryption Standard, 2001. Available at <http://csrc.
nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>
Amin, R., Biswas, G.P., 2015. A novel user authentication and key
agreement protocol for accessing multi-medical server usable in
TMIS. J. Med. Syst. 39 (3), 1–17.
AVISPA Web Tool. Avaliable at: <http://www.avispa-project.org/
web-interface/expert.php/>. Accessed on April, 2015
AVISPA. Automated validation of internet security protocols and
applications. Avaliable at: <http://www.avispa-project.org/>
Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H., 2001. Analysis of key exchange protocols
and their use for building secure channels. In: Proceedings of the
Advances in Cryptology (Eurocrypt’01). Springer-Verlag, LNCS,
pp. 453–474.
Chang, C.C., Chang, Y.F., 2004. A novel three-party encrypted key
exchange protocol. Comput. Stand. Interfaces 26 (5), 472–476.
Chen, T.H., Lee, W.B., Chen, H.B., 2008a. A round-and computation-
efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol. J. Syst.
Softw. 81 (9), 1581–1590.
Chen, H.B., Chen, T.H., Lee, W.B., Chang, C.C., 2008b. Security
enhancement for a three-party encrypted key exchange protocol
against undetectable on-line password guessing attacks. Comput.
Stand. Interfaces 30, 95–99.
Cheng, Z., Nistazakis, M., Comley, R., Vasiu, L., 2005. On the
indistinguishability-based security model of key agreement proto-
cols-simple cases. Cryptology ePrint Archieve, Report 2005/129.
Chung, H.R., Ku, W.C., 2008. Three weaknesses in a simple three-
party key exchange protocol. Inf. Sci. 178 (1), 220–229.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authenti
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer aDolev, D., Yao, A., 1983. On the security of public key protocols.
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 29 (2), 198–208.
Gong, L., 1992. A security risk of depending on synchronized clocks.
ACM Operating Syst. Rev. 26 (1), 49–53.
Guo, H., Li, Z., Mu, Y., Zhang, X., 2008. Cryptanalysis of simple
three-party key exchange protocol. Comput. Secur. 28 (1–2), 16–21.
He, D., Chen, Y., Chen, J., 2013. An Id-based three party authenti-
cated key exchange protocol using elliptic curve cryptography for
mobile commerce environments. Arab. J. Sci. Eng. 38 (8), 2055–
2061.
He, D., Kumar, N., Lee, J.-H., Sherratt, R.S., 2014. Enhanced Three-
factor Security Protocol for Consumer USB Mass Storage Devices.
IEEE Trans. Consum. Electron. 60 (1), 30–37.
Islam, S.H., 2014a. Provably secure dynamic identity-based three-
factor password authentication scheme using extended chaotic
maps. Nonlinear Dyn. 78 (3), 2261–2276.
Islam, S.H., 2014b. Design and analysis of an improved smartcard
based remote user password authentication scheme. Int. J. Com-
mun Syst. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/dac.2793.
Islam, S.H., 2014c. A provably secure ID-based mutual authentication
and key agreement scheme for mobile multi-server environment
without ESL attack. Wireless Pers. Commun. 79, 1975–1991.
Islam, S.H., Biswas, G.P., 2012. An improved pairing-free identity-
based authenticated key agreement protocol based on ECC. Proc.
Int. Conf. Commun. Technol. Syst. Des. Procedia Eng. 30, 499–
507.
Islam, S.H., Biswas, G.P., 2013. An efficient and secure strong
designated verifier signature scheme without bilinear pairings. J.
Appl. Math. Inf. 31 (3–4), 425–441.
Islam, S.H., Biswas, G.P., 2014. A provably secure identity-based
strong designated verifier proxy signature scheme from bilinear
pairings. J. King Saud Univ. Comput. Inf. Sci. 26 (1), 55–67.
Islam, S.H., Khan, M.K., 2014. Cryptanalysis and improvement of
authentication and key agreement protocols for telecare medicine
information systems. J. Med. Syst. 38 (10), 1–16.
Islam, S.H., Khan, M.K., Obaidat, M.S., Muhaya, F.T.B., 2015.
Provably secure and anonymous password authentication protocol
for roaming service in global mobility networks using extended
chaotic maps. Wireless Pers. Commun. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s11277-015-2542-8.
Koblitz, N., 1987. Elliptic curve cryptosystem. Math. Comput. 48,
203–209.
Lee, T.F., Hwang, T., 2010. Simple password-based three-party
authenticated key exchange without server public keys. Inf. Sci.
180 (9), 1702–1714.
Lee, T.F., Hwang, T., Lin, C.L., 2004. Enhanced three-party encrypted
key exchange without server public keys. Comput. Secur. 23 (7),
571–577.
Lin, C., Sun, H.M., Hwang, T., 2000. Three-party encrypted key
exchange: attacks and a solution. ACM Operating Syst. Rev. 34
(4), 12–20.
Lin, C., Sun, H.M., Steiner, M., Hwang, T., 2001. Three-party
encrypted key exchange without server public-keys. IEEE Com-
mun. Lett. 5 (12), 497–499.
Lu, R., Cao, Z., 2006. Simple three-party key exchange protocol.
Comput. Secur. 26, 94–97.
Mandt, T.K., 2006. Certificate less authenticated two-party key
agreement protocols (Master’s thesis), Gjvik University College,
Department of Computer Science and Media Technology.
Menezes, A.J., Orschot, P.C., Vanstone, S.A., 1996. Hand-Book of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press.
Message Digest Algorithm, 1992. Available at <http://people.csail.
mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-MD5.txt>
Nam, J., Kim, S., Won, D., 2006. Attack on the Sun-Chen-Hwang’s
three-party key agreement protocols using passwords. IEICE
Trans. Fundam. E89-A (1), 209–212.
Nose, P., 2011. Security weaknesses of authenticated key agreement
protocols. Inf. Process. Lett. 11 (14), 687–696.cated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
14 S. H. Islam et al.Phan, R.C.W., Yau, W.C., Goi, B.M., 2008. Cryptanalysis of simple
three-party key exchange protocol (S-3PAKE). Inf. Sci. 178, 2849–
2856.
Pu, Q., Zhao, X., Ding, J., 2009. Cryptanalysis of a three-party
authenticated key exchange protocol using elliptic curve
cryptography. In: Proceedings of the International
Conference on Research Challenges in Computer Science,
pp. 7–10.
Reddy, P.V., Padmavathamma, M., 2007. An authenticated key
exchange protocol in elliptic curve cryptography. J. Discrete Math.
Sci. Cryptogr. 10 (5), 697–705.
Schneier, B., 1996. Applied Cryptography, Protocols, Algorithms, and
Source Code, second ed. Wiley.
Sun, H., Chen, B., Hwang, T., 2005. Secure key agreement protocols
for three-party against guessing attacks. J. Syst. Softw. 75,
63–68.Please cite this article in press as: Islam, S. H. et al., An improved three party authent
for mobile-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer aTan, Z., 2010a. An enhanced three-party authentication key exchange
protocol for mobile commerce environments. J. Commun. 5 (5),
436–443.
Tan, Z., 2010b. An Improvement on a three party authentication key
exchange protocol using elliptic curve cryptography. J. Conver-
gence Inf. Technol. 5 (4), 120–129.
Yang, J.H., Chang, C.C., 2009. An efficient three-party authenticated
key exchange protocol using elliptic curve cryptography for mobile-
commerce environments. J. Syst. Softw. 82, 1497–1502.
Yang, J., Seo, C., Cho, J., 2007. A three party authenticated key
exchange scheme smartcard using elliptic curve cryptosystem for
secure key exchange in wireless sensor network. In: Proceedings of
the International Symposium on Consumer Electronics, pp. 1–6.
Yoon, E.J., Yoo, K.Y., 2008. Improving the novel three-party
encrypted key exchange protocol. Comput. Stand. Interfaces 30,
309–314.icated key exchange protocol using hash function and elliptic curve cryptography
nd Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.08.002
